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DUAL TRACK SELL-OUT:  
SIGNALING THROUGH IPO AND UNDERPRICING. 
 
Abstract 
Recent empirical analyses suggest the existence of a new exit strategy for private 
companies’ owners: the dual track sell-out. This paper aims to understand whether this 
strategy involves signals and why some firms undertake it more than others. I build a 
model depicting how going public and underpricing arise also as a response to 
asymmetric information. Target firms and market’s characteristics influence both 
signaling choices in equilibrium and conditions under which going public costs are 
offset by its benefits. It is shown that signaling plays a relevant role, answering why 
most firms dual tracking are characterized by valuation uncertainty. 











Most financial literature studied IPOs as instruments of fund raising, but recent 
empirical research started focusing on other rationales. Among these, IPOs have been 
recognized to be a step that managers of private firms undertake before selling their 
company.
1
 The name of this procedure is dual track sell-out. Although going public is 
costly, there exist several advantages stemming from this strategy, such as enhanced 
visibility, higher bargaining power and cheaper information available to market players. 
Nonetheless dual track sell-out is not undertaken by all companies alike. M&A 
transactions in which the target is a newly listed company are usually characterized by 
remarkable uncertainty. Furthermore the value extractable by acquirers usually derives 
from exploiting target unique resources rather than from cost synergies, which in turn 
would be more easily assessable. 
The model developed in this paper shows how asymmetric information 
reinforces the necessity to go public. Target companies are framed in a market 
characterized by imperfect information where there is a potential buyer. They can 
decide either to stay private or to go public at a fixed cost. If firms choose to undertake 
the IPO, they can decide whether and how much to underprice the issue at a 
proportional cost. Model outcomes depend on buyer’s beliefs and on actions’ costs and 
benefits. At any cost level better quality companies are more prone to dual track than 
worse ones, and the higher the quality the larger the level of underpricing observed in 
the public market.    
 The target choice can be so sensitive to information related issues that 
procedures as complex as IPOs can be driven by reasons different from the ones 
                                                             
1 Soumendra and Jindra (2012) find that, on a sample of 6076 IPOs between 1980 and 2006, 15% of the newly listed 
companies became acquisition targets.  
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conventionally accepted. Companies suffering valuation distortions due to asymmetric 
information should be aware of the self-selection benefits given by instruments 
commonly designed for other scopes. On the counterpart side, buyers facing valuation 
uncertainty due to lack of information can take advantage from the observation of these 
unconventional signals. Public investors, which are eventually used as a mean of 
signaling, must consider the financial implications of this alternative way of facing 
companies undertaking IPOs. They can benefit from both excessive underpricing and 
subsequent takeover premia. Strategies as going public can be used to achieve a 
multitude of goals, reason why a deeper analysis of dual tracking is necessary to permit 
interested actors to understand what moves to make in this context. 
2. Literature Review. 
Whereas IPOs viewed as a signal is a recent concept, the Underpricing puzzle
2
  
has inspired a vast literature. In a study relying on US data of the last 30 years it was 
found that the average “first day return” of IPOs was of 17%.
3
 The first two hypotheses 
to explain relied on asymmetric information, either between issuers and underwriters 
(Baron 1982) or among investors (Rock 1987). The former asserts that price is 
manipulated in order to reward underwriters for their better information on investors’ 
demand whereas the latter states that underpricing arises in situations where informed 
and uninformed investors coexist. The informed agents are aware of the issue quality 
before buying it, causing expected losses to uninformed ones, who will obtain shares 
only in “bad IPOs”. Asymmetric information was also theorized by Allen and Faulhaber 
(1988) and Welch (1989). Unlike the above mentioned hypotheses, underpricing is 
analyzed as a tool used by firms to signaling quality. Both papers argue that 
                                                             
2 Underpricing is usually defined as the gap between the market price obtained in the market and the issuing price.  
The existence of it is puzzling because it corresponds to “money left on the table” by companies. 
3 Data taken from Ritter, Jay. 2011.  “Initial Public Offering: Underpricing Statistics Through 2011”.  
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underpricing firm’s initial offering adds sunk costs that prevent low quality firms from 
imitating, asserting that only good companies are able to recover unproductive losses 
when performance is realized.   
Recent empirical papers focus on the analysis of the dual tracking phenomenon, 
stressing the higher quality of the companies undertaking it and the presence of 
asymmetric information. Unlike traditional funding oriented IPOs, the process of going 
public is studied as a strategic device for owners to turn company status into public. 
Reuer and Shen (2003), state that divestiture via IPO is more likely when buyer 
valuation of targets suffers information asymmetries too costly to be avoided. Empirical 
evidence suggests that dual tracking is more widely used in those industries with strong 
spatial scattering and in those firms embedded with a high level of intangible assets. 
Capron and Shen (2007) analyze how lack of information about private targets increases 
acquirers’ risks into M&A transactions and conclude that acquirers prefer to bid public 
companies when entering a new business. Ragozzino and Reuer (2007) studied how 
IPOs can diminish adverse selection by means of credible signals, stating that private 
market ones may not be reliable enough. Ragozzino (2011) again analyzes the 
relationship between IPO’s signals as, indeed, underpricing, and relates them to the 
geographic distance of a successive acquirer, finding a correlation between these two. In 
their analysis on harvest strategies Brau, Sutton and Hatch (2010) compare companies 
dual tracking with privately sold ones. The former are more often venture capital 
backed, framed in a bubble market and slightly larger
4
 and they usually belong to the 
high-tech industry. Braun, Lehmann and Schwerdfeger (2011) study German M&A 
market and find that acquisitions of newly listed targets are considered by the investors 
                                                             
4 The reasons for these three features are respectively: Venture Capitalists are willing to exit the business and take 
advantage of dual tracking benefits; during bubble years the optimism among investors may ease public issuances; 
larger companies are able to exploit economies of scales in offer costs.  
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as R&D investments, because reckoned as alternative to internal growth. Analyzing 
acquisition premia, Reuer, Tong and Wu (2012) find that being public benefits those 
targets whose acquirers belong to a different industry. Soumendra and Jindra (2012) 
examine newly listed company and conclude that acquisition targets are at least as good 
performers as those which have kept growing internally and that targets acquired shortly 
after listing show larger underpricing in high industry acquisition activity periods. 
3.  The Model. 
3.1 The Private Market. 
Assume that in the market there exists a population of private companies and 
that the quality of these follows a continuous distribution. Every type would like to sell-
out and leave the business and the probability with which an agent will show interest 
into acquiring a company in the private market is defined by .  This is a one-stage 
game, hence the expected payoff of any seller is determined by a linear combination of 
the value obtained by the acquisition with the stand-alone value attained by continuing 
the firm’s activity. Let us define iK the stand-alone payoff of firm i  and iV  the price that 
the acquirer would be willing to pay for the target if she knew the type with certainty. 
The value iV  does not have to reflect precisely the stand-alone value of the company 
plus all the synergies attainable from the transaction, because this would assume either 
that the seller is endowed with all the bargaining power or that there are at least two 
bidders with equal characteristics in a first-price auction. Nonetheless iV  is a price 
reflecting large part of them, since, in most industries, whenever the M&A transaction 
is not a “merger of equals”, the premium paid by an acquirer reflects most of the 
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synergies extractable. Consequently, define i  the quality of target i and assume   
distributes as a uniform with x  and y  respectively worst and best type:  
(I) [ , ]i U x y  
Now define iV  and iK  of the private market as follows: 
(II) i iV v   and iK kx K   with v k  
By the assumptions stated so far, if both parties were perfectly informed about 
sellers’ type, targets would obtain a first-best payoff given by: 
(III) (1 )iV K     i  
Let us assume that the main problem for the private companies is finding 
resources to deploy for their business. Hence when no transaction happens the stand-
alone value is the same for all types and by assumption (II) this amount corresponds to 
the least quality one. The rationale behind this assumption will become clearer when the 
public market framework is introduced. When acquisition takes place, instead, better 
targets will be offered higher prices reflecting larger values stemming from their higher 
quality. This feature is reflected in the fact that: 
(IV) i j i j i jv v V V         
Introducing asymmetric information, assume that targets know their own type 
while the buyer does not. The only common information is the uniform distribution of 
quality. The acquirer is no longer able to ascertain the true value and has to offer a 
common price that would prevent her from expected losses. The price determined in the 









      
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Notice that in this equilibrium there is no adverse selection, since (II) holds and 
P  is always greater than .K  
3.2 The possibility of going public. 
Let us introduce the choice to launch an Initial Public Offering before being 
acquired, completing the so called dual track sell-out procedure. The game is still one-
stage, therefore public payoffs are directly comparable with private ones. As it is in 
reality, undertaking an IPO implies a significant cost, represented by underwriter fees, 
disclosing procedures and a minimum level of underpricing
5
 of the stock issued. Define 
this cost .c  Besides, the price the buyer is willing to pay does not change since 
acquisition benefits are assumed not to vary.
6
 There are three main differences between 
the public and the private market framework: a higher acquisition probability, the 
possibility to excessively underprice the stock issuance and a change in the stand-alone 
value due to the results obtained by investing the IPO proceeds.  
First of all define   as the new probability with which a potential buyer shows 
interest in acquiring the targets and assume: 
(VI)    
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) study the ownership turnover phenomenon 
comparing private and public markets, finding out that the likelihood with which 
companies are acquired almost doubles within three years since when the IPO is 
launched. Also Shen and Capron (2007) state that private market is less visible to 
companies that are interested in an acquisition deal. They argue that data about public 
targets are easier to obtain because of mandatory information that must be audited and 
                                                             
5 This level of underpricing is not the one that will be used in the model. The model variable can be interpreted as 
“excessive underpricing” that is not related to the one necessary for the initial stock to be sold.  
6 Given the possibility of a higher number of bidders and lower discount factors in the public market, it would have 
been reasonable to assume 
PB PR
i iV V . Nonetheless the model equilbria would have not been relevantly affected. 
9 
 
disclosed to stockholders and thanks to larger analysts’ coverage. Running an IPO 
generates a consistent amount of advertisement, by means of either road shows or 
underwriter activity. The latter, which is usually an investment bank, can circulate the 
information that the firm is on sale and, as it often happens, can propose the deal to 
some of its clients in the future.  
The second main difference is that in the IPO issuance the company has an 
instrument of signaling. Higher quality targets can excessively underprice their stock 
issuance in order to add enough sunk costs that may prevent lower quality ones from 
mimicking such behavior. Define the variable cost due to undepricing as: 
(VII) ( , )i i i ic u u    i   
(VIII) ( )i iq N     with  N y  
where iu  is the level of undepricing chosen by company ,i  and i  is the marginal cost 
paid for an additional unit of .iu  The linear cost function differs for the several types, 
penalizing worse ones. N  is assumed to be larger than y  because we shall assume that 
underpricing is a costly choice also for the best type. This model is structured similarly 
to Spence (1973) education model, where workers were obtaining different wages 
depending on their level of education. The difference among workers was their ability to 
study, whereas here the difference stems from the ability to recover an unproductive 
loss due to “money left on the table” by means of underpricing. It is implicit that better 
companies will be able to overcome these costs with a smaller impact than lower quality 
ones. In fact, more profitable firms can bear the burden of excessive costs with more 
ease than the ones whose business is less capable of generating income. 
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The third difference between the private and the public market regards the stand-
alone value. The new stand-alone value is now different for the several types and 
depends on their quality: 
(IX) i iK k  
The change is due to the investment of the IPO proceeds collected. Higher 
quality companies will use the money collected to undertake better projects. Payoffs in 
the public market are now given by: 
(X) (1 ) ( , )i iP K c c u        i   
where P is to be determined in equilibrium and will depend on buyer’s beliefs. If there 
was no asymmetric information in the public market, the first best payoffs obtained by 
targets would be (X) with iP V  for company i  and 0 underpricing costs. 
3.3 The separating equilibrium in the public market. 
Let us now construct the separating equilibrium in the public market where 
better targets can differentiate themselves from worse ones. Assume that the buyer 
updates its beliefs monotonically such that: 
(XI) i ju u  when i j   and hence ( | ) 1iP type i u u    
For this equilibrium to hold, type i  must choose an underpricing level that 
makes her better off than undertaking other feasible actions. Besides, any other type 
must be worse off by choosing player i  action rather than its own. Assuming (XI) to 
hold, let us analyze the incentive compatibility constraints for two subsequent types, i
and ,j  with 0i j     : 
(XII) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )i i i i j i i jV K c c u V K c c u                
(XIII) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )j j j j i j j iV K c c u V K c c u               
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These conditions are the incentive compatibility constraints that make type i  
better off by choosing 
iu  rather than ,ju  but at the same time iu  is large enough to be 
unappealing for type j . The interval within which (XII) and (XIII) are both satisfied 
(see Appendix B) is: 
(XIV) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
( ) ( )
i j i j i j i j
i j i j
j i j i
V V V V v v
u u u u
q N q N
       
   
      
       
       
  
The undepricing level depends linearly on the probability of  being acquired in 
the public market ,  mainly because the benefit of signaling is just partial, since with 
complementary probability 1   the company will not receive any acquisition offer. 
Besides, both boundaries are affected by the difference in quality .i j   The larger the 
gap the higher the opportunity cost that better types incur in not signaling and receiving 
a worse type offer. Moreover, when the difference in quality is larger, also the 
hypothetical benefit from mimicking increases, making more expensive signal 
necessary. The difference between the lower and the upper bound is determined by the 
marginal costs of signaling. Underpricing must be low enough for type i  to take 
advantage from type revelation, hence the lower the marginal cost ( )i iq N    the 
looser the upper constraint. Besides, it must be high enough to prevent type j  from 
pooling. Likewise, the lower bound has an inverse relation with the marginal cost of 
mimicking ( ).j jq N    As it is standard in the signaling literature, let us use the 
intuitive criterion concept theorized by Cho and Kreps (1987) to select a unique 
equilibrium, and in particular the least costly one: the buyer never assigns positive 
probability to actions that would never be undertaken by company .j  Therefore the 
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Assume for the moment that all types are inside the public market. This means that the 
worst type doing dual tracking has quality .x  The company with worst quality will 
underprice 0 since she does not need to differentiate from any worse type. Using the 








v v N x
du d u






    
  
   
Notice that iu  collapses to 0  when i x   confirming that no underpricing is observed 
in the worst type. iu  increases with ,i  meaning that higher types underprice more, 
consistently with buyer’s beliefs. These results are linked to the Spence game with 
continuous types. Nonetheless, in this model the fully revealing equilibrium holds only 
if all companies have also incentive to do dual track, meaning that public payoffs for all 
types must dominate private market ones. Analyzing the new dynamics of the private 
market, assume IPO itself being a signal at cost .c  For the previous equilibrium to hold 
also the following participation constraint must be satisfied: 
(XVIII) (1 ) (1 )x x x xV K c V K          
We still assume prices to be monotone: if the amount offered by the potential buyer to 
the worst type in the public market is ,xV  the price obtainable in the private market 
cannot be larger than that. Condition (XVIII) implies that the worst type is better off by 
dual tracking even though the action does not contribute to its quality revelation. If 
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(XVIII) holds, also all the types with quality higher than x  are better off by dual 
tracking rather than staying private because the incentive compatibility constraints must 
hold in equilibrium (see Appendix D). Therefore (XVIII) is a sufficient condition for 
the equilibrium just described to hold.   
Define xc  the value of c  that makes (XVIII) hold with equality: 
(XIX) ( )( ) ( )( )x x xc V K x v k          
We can affirm that for xc c the following equilibrium holds: all types go 
public; every type is paid its true value: type i is paid ;iV  the underpricing level of type 










 buyer beliefs are such that if a company is public and 
underprices ,iu  that company is type i with probability 1; the price offered in the 
private market is .xV  When c  is above this threshold, some of the worst types would be 
better off choosing to stay private, changing the equilibrium dynamics. 
3.4 The semi-pooling equilibrium.  
 The analysis will now focus on how the equilibrium configurations change as 
the fixed cost c  present in the market varies. In the equilibrium discussed so far all 
types were incentivized to go public and benefit from both quality revelation and higher 
acquisition probabilities. In the equilibria in which c  is above xc  dynamics slightly 
change. A fraction of types, the lower quality ones, will reckon dual tracking too 
expensive and will decide to remain private. Buyer beliefs update through Bayes rule 
and the price offered in the private market is driven by worse quality companies. On the 
other hand the types deciding to dual track will still underprice. Nonetheless every type 
will rely on this signal less the smaller the portion inside the public market. 
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 Let us define 
j
c  the cost level at which type j  with quality j  is indifferent 
between dual tracking and staying private. This means that at 
j
c  every type with 
quality above or equal to j  will be public, whereas all the types below choose to 
remain private. Therefore at 
j
c  the price offered by the buyer in the private market is 
updated through Bayes rule (see Appendix E): 









    
Notice that this price increases in .j  The larger j  the better the quality of the types in 
the private market, and therefore higher prices will be offered. But at which value of 
j
c  
does this situation arise? At 
j
c  type j  is indifferent between dual tracking and staying 
private, meaning that j  is the worst type inside the public market. As in the former 
equilibrium in which every type was inside the public market and x  was not signaling, 
type j  will underprice 0 and will anyway be able to differentiate from types whose 
quality is worse than .j  Hence, the condition under which the situation just described 
holds is: 
(XXI) (1 ) (1 )
jj j j
v k c vP kx            
Combining (XX) and (XXI), 
j
c  becomes a function of :j  





c v v k kx

     

       
Of course, substituting ,j x   the xc  obtained is exactly the one of (XIX) (see 
Appendix F). The derivative of (XXII) with respect to quality j  is: 
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      
We can notice that 
j
c  increases with j  meaning that the higher the quality the larger 
the c  threshold at which the company will decide to remain private. 
 Having defined 
j
c  for any hypothetical type ,j  we can proceed to analyze the 
behavior of the companies still dual tracking and compute the portion of them. As afore 
mentioned, at 
j
c the worst type doing dual tracking has quality .j  Being j  already 
able to differentiate itself by going public, no further costs are going to be added 
through underpricing. Nonetheless, for types of quality better than j  the reasoning 
developed in the situation in which all the types were dual tracking remains unchanged: 
(XV) and (XVI) are still valid. The only difference that arises is due to the fact that now 
0 underpricing is no longer associated with quality x  but with quality .j  Hence, the 


















    
  
   
Comparing (XVII) and (XXIV) it can be noticed that, since ,j x   signal expense is 
lower for every type. Anyway we should not be deceived by this finding. In reality 
higher quality companies are already paying a c  that is not sustainable by the lower 
quality ones, and therefore the added sunk costs deriving from underpricing are relevant 
only within targets that are dual tracking. As previously mentioned, while 
j
c  increases 
in ,j  the higher the quality of the worst target dual tracking the lower iu  for any type: 













For any level of c  there exists a fraction of firms dual tracking. This portion is 1 
whenever ,xc c  but it decreases with c  when fixed costs are above this threshold. 
Define 
yc  the cost at which the best type is indifferent between dual tracking and 
remaining private. Using (XXII): 




c vy v ky kx   

       
Above this threshold no type will dual track, and therefore the pooling equilibrium 
defined in section 3.1 is completely restored. This means that when yc c  the number 
of types dual tracking must collapse to 0. Define   the fraction of types dual tracking. 
Since at any 
j











This definition of  is consistent with the reasoning so far explained since: 
(XXVIII) 1
j x j
c c x         
(XXIX) 0
j y j
c c y         
which is exactly what we have previously forecasted. Whenever c  is smaller than or 
equal to xc  every type is dual tracking and   is 1. When c  is above ,yc  instead, no 
type will dual track, and the equilibrium found is the same described in the situation in 
which only the private market choice is available to target companies. 








 types go public; 
only public types are paid their true value: type i is paid ;iV  the level of underpricing of 
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 buyer beliefs are such that if a company is public and 
underprices ,iu  that company is type i with probability 1; the price offered in the 







  at every 
j  corresponds a jc level. 
At 
yc c  the private market equilibrium holds: no type goes public; no type is 
paid its true value but the median type; buyer beliefs are such that all companies are in 






 As shown in the description of model equilibria, there is a direct relationship 
between c  levels and information revelation. The lower the fixed costs the larger the 
number of targets being paid their true price, since more companies dual track. When c  
is too high, instead, and in specific above ,yc  no information is revealed since no 
company can afford the cost of going public. When analyzing targets’ payoffs, larger 
sc  generate two main effects: a lower underpricing for any public type, caused by the 
smaller number of targets dual tracking, and a larger pooling price paid to private ones, 
due to the fact that companies with better quality decide to remain private. Let us 
analyze how a generic type j  payoff varies at different c  levels. 
 
Graph 1. Type j  payoff at any c  level (see Appendix H). 
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As shown in Graph 1, j  payoff  decreases in c  up to ,xc  since fixed costs are such that 
no type is better off by remaining private. When 
jx
c c c   the effect is ambiguous 
because increasing c  causes underpricing to decrease, eventually becoming 0 at .
j
c  
For c  above 
j
c  target j  payoff is determined in the private market and it 
unambiguously increases the larger the fixed costs, because, as aforementioned, larger 
sc  correspond to higher pooling prices offered. 
3.5 Comparison with perfect information. 
Having analyzed types’ behavior under different levels of fixed costs, let us 
examine the implications of asymmetric information in this model. In the case of 
perfectly informed agents, seller choices would have been between: 
(XXX)            (1 )j jv k c         and (1 )jv kx     
because in both markets all targets are paid their true value and no underpricing is 
observed.
7
 From (XXX), threshold 
'
j
c  is different from ,jc  the one computed under 
asymmetric information: 
(XXXI) 
' ( ) (1 ) (1 )
j j j
c v k kx              
In order to understand which threshold is larger, take 
' :
j j
c c   
(XXXII) 





c c v v v x 
 
   

        
From (XXXII) we can see that, even though there is no difference for ,j x   the 
threshold under asymmetric information is larger than the one under perfectly informed 
agents. This happens for all parameter values. A higher threshold means that at the same 
level of ,c  the fraction   of companies dual tracking under asymmetric information is 
                                                             
7 Underpricing is used only as a signal and it does not give any benefit to targets but type revelation. 
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larger, leading to the conclusion that dual tracking is more widely used in a situation of 
higher uncertainty. From (XXXII) we can also notice that the difference depends 
positively on ,v  suggesting that there is more value in revealing information when 
targets can attain higher prices from acquisition.  
3.6 M&A waves: high acquisition periods. 
In the last part of the former chapter we saw that a larger v  causes the difference 
between perfect and asymmetric information threshold to be wider. M&A waves are 
usually triggered either by technological shocks or by better investment opportunities, 
suggesting an increase in the prices paid by acquirers. Nonetheless, by assuming that in 
high acquisition periods the better value extractable by a potential buyer is reflected in a 
rise of v  would imply that high quality targets would benefit more than low ones, since 





  In order to avoid this problem, let us assume that larger values 
extractable are the same for every type. If companies are acquired during M&A waves 
the price the acquirer is willing to pay is increased by iW W  for every .i  How is any  
j
c  threshold affected? Call j
hc  the new threshold that arises in high acquisition 
periods. Using condition (XXI) the new value is: 





c v v k kx W W

       

          
( )
j
c W      
Since ( ) 0,W    the difference between 
j
hc  and jc  is positive. From (XXXIII) we 
can conclude that under high acquisition periods more targets dual track. Regarding 
underpricing, whereas there is no direct effect because W  would be added on both 
sides of (XIII), there exists an indirect effect. All else equal, M&A waves induce a 
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larger number of firms to dual track, causing all underpricing levels observed to be 
higher. 
4. Empirical connections. 
 Divesture via IPO advantages can be split into two categories: direct advantages 
deriving from a public status and indirect advantages given by signaling opportunities 
available during the IPO procedure.  
The former ones mainly rely on the amount and on the quality of information 
flows produced in the public market. Public companies are continuously monitored by 
dispersed shareholders and financial markets, whereas mandatory information must be 
audited and disclosed to stockholders, media and regulators. Furthermore corporate 
governance standards are tighter, because of fixed organizational rules and due to the 
presence of Code of Conducts. These characteristics influence the riskiness perceived 
by potential acquirers, who may feel more confident to attach lower discount rates, 
ending up valuing the business more than how it would have been estimated in the 
private market. Empirical evidence shows that average acquisition premia are larger in 
the public market compared to private ones (Brau, Sutton and Hatch 2010). Besides, 
publicly accessible information eases possible acquisitions, increasing the probability of 
a takeover offer (Pagano, Panetta and Zingales 1998). In a private framework, instead, 
an acquirer will undertake the process of acquisition only once enough private 
information is obtained (Capron and Shen 2007). 
 Indirect advantages instead rely on quality revelation achievable either through 
IPO alone or by adding underpricing. In most of the empirical studies which had 
focused on the dual tracking phenomenon one common feature is present in the firms 
acquired shortly after listing: high uncertainty about company valuation. This 
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characteristic justifies the presence of asymmetric information and, as the model shows, 
suggests that the dual track sell-out is more common under uncertain environments 
because of its signaling function.   
Analyzing recent empirical papers it becomes clear how asymmetric information 
is relevant for the dual tracking decision. The first example applies to companies with 
large values dependent on intangible assets. Acquisition value stems from better 
employability of intangible resources otherwise not exploitable and on perceived 
growth opportunities rather than from assets in place and business model employed 
(Ragozzino and Reuer 2007). Reuer and Shen (2003) findings confirm the former view, 
pointing chemical and allied products, electronic and electrical equipments and R&D 
intensive industries to be the ones mostly implementing the dual tracking strategy. 
Braun and Lehman (2011) analysis of the German market leads to the conclusion that in 
R&D oriented industries these kinds of transactions are commonly considered as 
internal R&D investments. The common key characteristics of these new enterprises are 
specific human-capital and technological know-how. Other kinds of deals that arise 
when the target company has gone public lately are those related to business-wise or 
geographical distance of acquirers. When a company wants to enter new businesses, 
extra value from acquisitions can be reflected in the possibility to obtain a “ticket to 
play” in such activity. Buyers are more likely going to buy private targets when making 
an acquisition within the same industry, whereas they will buy public ones when 
targeting different firms, due to their difficult valuation. The reasoning holds also when 
buyers are entering a geographically new market. Acquirers may prefer to buy private 
targets for local search but they will buy public ones for companies geographically 
distant, due to a higher uncertainty (Capron and Shen 2007). Ragozzino and Reuer 
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(2011) study the connections between the IPO procedure and acquirer geographical 
distance, observing that farther targets are more affected by information asymmetries 
and that there is a relevant role for signaling. Findings just discussed share the idea that 
buyers face difficulties valuing targets either because of industry nature or because of 
acquirer’s inexperience.  
Most empirical papers suggest IPO alone as a sufficient signal, regardless of the 
possibility to underprice. Soumedra and Jindra (2012), who furthermore conclude that 
newly listed firms acquired are good performers, find that targets have significantly 
larger underpricing in time of high acquisition industry, while under normal conditions 
dual tracking firms experience underpricing levels in line with the ones observed in 
companies going public for other reasons, suggesting that there exists a rationale for 
signaling combinations. M&A waves are usually triggered by technology shocks and 
better investment opportunities, increasing the potential value extractable through 
acquisitions. Every c  threshold analyzed in the model positively depends on acquisition 
values, and, as analyzed in 3.6, higher acquisition prices lead more targets to dual track. 
This behavior is compatible with Soumendra and Jindra findings, since equilibria with 
larger fractions of companies dual tracking are characterized by higher underpricing 
levels. 
5. Theoretical predictions. 
As discovered by analyzing the model, equilibrium predictions hinge on 
company variables and on IPO costs. The full revelation equilibrium prevails when all 
firms find dual tracking beneficial and every company but the worst underprice the 
public issuance. The scenario changes when some targets can take advantage of the 
public status but others cannot. Full information revelation is achieved only by those 
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targets undertaking the IPO, whereas in the private market more and more companies 
pool when going public costs increase. Inside the public market, higher types 
underprice more, but the smaller the portion of firms dual tracking the lower the 
underpricing level of every target. In particular, we have seen that the smaller the costs 
related to the IPO signal the higher the underpricing that must be paid to be able to 
differentiate, because more targets will be able to benefit from dual tracking. The 
private market equilibrium analyzed in the very first section prevails when costs are 
relatively too high with respect to companies’ fundamentals and when no firm can take 
advantage of quality revelation. It is a question for further empirical research to 
understand which equilibrium is more representative in the various situations. 
6. Conclusions. 
IPO implies more than just fund raising: it is a strategic decision. In a world of 
imperfect markets, perfect contracts cannot be stipulated. Dual tracking and 
underpricing are not the only signals available to private companies. Nonetheless the 
main goal of this work was to understand whether dual tracking could be effectively 
considered a valuable signal and if excessive underpricing was justifiable as a 
complementary instrument. 
Market and firm related characteristics influence the benefits achievable through 
the dual tracking procedure. Although there exist direct advantages attainable by 
changing target status from private to public, IPO itself plus issuance underpricing are 
shown to be also responses to asymmetric information, causing companies framed 
within uncertain environments to be more prone to dual track. The validity as a signal 
increases with the costs to be sustained. Larger levels of underpricing arise when the 
costs of going public are not sufficient to prevent worse types from dual tracking. In 
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other words the revelation effectiveness of the IPO procedure depends on its feasibility 
and underpricing can be considered as a signal reinforcement. 
Dual tracking decision does not rely only on public status benefits. A self-
selection process allows those actors who are framed in uncertain environments to 
benefit also from quality revelation. Gains belong to both better targets, since 
uncertainty favors poor companies and damage good ones, and buyers who become 
more confident of their valuations. Any company choice should be analyzed under 
several lights in order to capture its assessment drivers and very often, for decisions as 
largely analyzed as undertaking Initial Public Offerings, any interested party can easily 
oversee key elements that would totally change the meaning behind those actions.  
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The pooling price paid in equilibrium by the acquirer is the expected value of :iV  
(A.I) ( ) ( ) ( )i i iP E V vE vE      
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(B.I) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )i i i i j i i jV K c c u V K c c u                
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Developing (XII) instead: 
(B.II) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )j j j j i j j iV K c c u V K c c u                
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )j j j j i j j iv k c q N u v k c q N u                     
















Notice that since :i j   
(B.III) 
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Solving the differential equation (XVI) for any type i  we obtain: 
(C.I) 
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The worst quality type payoff in the public market is: 
(D.I) (1 )x xV K c     
First of all we must make sure that all the incentive compatibility constraints are 
satisfied. Given that the relationship between type i  and j  payoffs described in (XII) 
and (XIII) holds, take a hypothetical type r  such that 0j r      and therefore 


















The following incentive compatibility constraints for i and r  must be satisfied: 
(D.III) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )i i i i r i i rv k c q N u v k c q N u                     
(D.IV) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )r r r r i r r iv k c q N u v k c q N u                     
Meaning that: 
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 first. Using (XV) and (D.II): 
(D.VI) 
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 we still use (XV) and (D.II): 
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and it is showed that also the IC represented in (D.IV) is slack. The reasoning made 
above can be repeated and applied to all types. 
After the demonstration above, we can compare the actual payoff of a hypothetical type 
i  with one obtained by mimicking x : 
(D.VIII) (1 ) ( , ) (1 )i i i i x iV K c c u V K c             
But for construction ,i xK K  and we can say that: 
(D.III) 1 ) (1 )x i x xV K c V K c           














































The cost function is: 





c v v k kx

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Substituting j x  : 




c vx v kx kx x v k     

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Appendix G. 
Replicating the same reasoning as in appendix C: 
(G.I) log
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Graph 1. Type j  payoff at any c  level. 
 
